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ABSTRACT
There is broad agreement among commentators and analysts that
Russia seeks to undermine the US-led liberal international order. At
the same time, there is considerable disagreement over the nature
and extent of the challenge Moscow poses, the underlying drivers
of Russian revisionism, and how the West should respond. In this
article, we argue that it is possible to distinguish between three
major perspectives. In brief, the ﬁrst suggests that Russia is a
‘revanchist power’ that seeks to overturn the very foundations of
the liberal world order. The second perspective holds that Russia is
a ‘defensive power’ that works for incremental changes within the
existing order. The third perspective contends that Russia is an
‘aggressive isolationist’, meaning that the Putin regime deliberately
plays a spoiler role in international aﬀairs to boost its domestic
legitimacy. This article describes in detail the arguments of the
three perspectives; it shows that each suﬀers from explanatory
shortcomings and defects; and it outlines how the contributions to
this special issue address the identiﬁed shortcomings.
KEYWORDS
Russian foreign policy; world
order; East-West crisis
Introduction
In recent years, the US-led liberal world order that emerged after the end of the Cold War
has been shaken. Developments within the West, such as the election of Donald Trump
and his ‘America First’ agenda, Britain’s decision to leave the European Union, and the
rise of populist parties across Europe, have created a climate of uncertainty. In addition,
the rise of China has triggered worries about a looming conﬂict between Washington
and Beijing. In many ways, though, what has emerged as the most immediate challenge
to the current international order is Russia’s increasingly proactive and assertive behav-
iour. Examples include Russia’s annexation of Crimea and meddling in eastern Ukraine;
Russia’s military intervention in Syria on behalf of the Assad government; the Kremlin’s
alleged interference in the 2016 US presidential elections; the funding of populist move-
ments and parties in a number of European countries; and the promotion of new insti-
tutional arrangements like the Eurasian Economic Union and the BRICS-led New
Development Bank.
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Moreover, Russian state oﬃcials have sharply criticized the post-Cold War arrange-
ments, making it clear that they want to revise or even upend the existing order. As Pre-
sident Putin said in his (in)famous speech at the Munich security conference in 2007, ‘I
consider that the unipolar model is not only unacceptable but also impossible in
today’s world (…) [T]he model itself is ﬂawed,’ he added, ‘because at its basis there is
and can be no moral foundations for modern civilization’ (Kremlin, 2007). A decade
later, also speaking at the Munich security conference, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei
Lavrov told his audience, ‘I hope that [the world] will choose a democratic world order
– a post-West one – in which each country is deﬁned by its sovereignty’ (quoted in Al
Jazeera, 2017). Addressing the United Nations General Assembly a few months later,
Lavrov doubled down. ‘The process of creating a polycentric world order is an objective
trend,’ he concluded, adding some thinly veiled criticism of the United States and its
Western allies. ‘This is something everyone will need to adapt to, including those who
are used to lording over others,’ Lavrov said (quoted in CNN, 2017). Likewise, Evgeny
Lukyanov, the Deputy Secretary of Russia’s Security Council, suggested in the wake of
the Ukraine crisis, ‘We need to sit down [with the United States] and renegotiate the
entire post-Cold War settlement’ (quoted in Weber, 2015). The list of such statements
could go on, but the point is clear: The Russian leadership has repeatedly and vociferously
expressed its dissatisfaction with the existing US-led international order.
Not surprisingly, Moscow’s rhetoric and actions have generated substantial media com-
mentary and scholarly attention (see, e.g. Kanet, 2018; Krickovic & Weber, 2017; Lo, 2015;
Radin & Reach, 2017). Building upon the existing literature, this special issue will engage
with three sets of questions that cut to the heart of the ongoing debate about Russia’s
role in the present world order.
1. What are Russia’s aims and objectives? Is Russia a highly revisionist power bent on over-
turning established rules and institutions, or is it best understood as a country with
limited ambitions, aiming to make incremental changes within the existing inter-
national structures?
2. What shapes Russia’s views on the global order and its consequent foreign policies?
Can they be attributed to material factors such as changing balances of power, to dom-
estic political factors such as the Kremlin’s regime security concerns, or to ideational
factors such as Russia’s national identity and its perceptions of history?
3. What are the consequences of Russia’s actions for the existing international order? And
how should the United States and Europe respond to Moscow’s behaviour? Should the
West adopt a tough containment policy as it did during the Cold War? Should the West
employ targeted sanctions and focus on punishing the Russian leadership? Or should
the West instead pursue an engagement policy and try to accommodate Moscow?
To address these questions, this special issue brings together scholars who analyse
Russia’s world order policies through the lenses of diﬀerent theoretical approaches, includ-
ing the English School, E.H. Carr’s classical realism, social constructivism, and a long durée
perspective. In particular, the contributors focus on Russia’s relationship with three major
power centres: the United States, China, and the European Union. To be sure, the evolution
of world order is aﬀected by many factors, such as technological changes, economic devel-
opments, social movements, and so forth. At heart, however, international order is heavily
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shaped by the leading powers of the time. Thus, this special issue seeks to shed light on
Russia’s role in, and views on, the existing international order by focusing on its relations
with major power centres.
To facilitate this analytical endeavour, our introductory article proceeds in three parts.
First, we outline the existing positions in the debate and their key arguments. Second, we
show why they fail to provide fully convincing accounts of Russia’s world order policy. And
third, we preview the individual contributions to this special issue.
Russian foreign policy and the liberal world order: three perspectives
According to John Ikenberry (2009, 2011), the US-led world order that emerged after the
end of the Cold War can be deﬁned as a liberal rule-based system that is characterized by
three interrelated features: the spread of democracy, the globalization of trade and
ﬁnance, and the formation of a dense network of international organizations. In recent
years, Russia has challenged this order, or at least certain elements of it. As already
noted, this has sparked an intense and sometimes heated debate among Western policy-
makers, pundits, and academics. In particular, there is considerable disagreement about
the nature and extent of Moscow’s challenge to the present order, the underlying
drivers of Russian revisionism, and how the West should respond. At the risk of oversim-
plifying a rich and fast-growing body of literature, we suggest that one can distinguish
between three main perspectives. Of course, observers and analysts within each perspec-
tive do not agree on everything, but they share some distinct arguments and viewpoints.1
Russia as a revanchist power
One group of observers holds that Russia aims to overturn the foundations of the liberal
world order. Moscow’s revisionist agenda manifests itself in several ways. First, Russia chal-
lenges established rules and norms in the post-Soviet space, including the sanctity of inter-
national borders (Dibb, 2016, p. 8). The takeover of Crimea, in this perspective, was only the
latest, and most extreme, example of a much broader pattern of behaviour. Over the
course of the past decade, Russia has gone to war with Georgia; repeatedly interfered
in the domestic political aﬀairs of neighbouring countries; exerted various forms of econ-
omic pressure on states like Ukraine, Moldova, and Lithuania; and expanded its network of
military bases in the post-Soviet region (Payne & Foster, 2017, pp. 18–33; Starr & Cornell,
2014). The ultimate goal of these activities is to establish an exclusive sphere of inﬂuence
on the territory of the former Soviet Union. In the words of Kagan (2008, p. 17), ‘[Moscow’s]
grand ambition is to undo the post-Cold War settlement to re-establish Russia as a domi-
nant power in Eurasia.’
Second, Russia seeks to exploit the West’s openness and vulnerabilities – information
systems, political pluralism, and socio-economic fault lines – to create divisions within
the Euro-Atlantic community. Perhaps the best-known example is Russia’s interference
in the 2016 US presidential race between Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump (Lipton,
Sanger, & Shane, 2016). There are also rumours about Russian meddling in the 2017
French presidential elections. After all, the candidate of the far-right National Front,
Marine Le Pen, met with President Putin in March 2017, and it became known that her
party had previously received a USD 9 million loan from a Moscow-based bank (Seddon
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& Stothard, 2017). More generally, Russia has established links with an array of far-right
political parties and movements across Europe (Larrabee et al., 2017, pp. 56–60; Polyakova,
2014; Polyakova, Laruelle, Meister, & Barnett, 2016; for background, see Shekhovtsov,
2018). Russia has also used its media outlets, including RT (formerly Russia Today) and
Sputnik, to sow disinformation. The infamous ‘Lisa case’ – when Russian media falsely
reported about the abduction and rape of a German girl of Russian origin by immigrants
in Berlin – is a case in point (Meister, 2016; Wagstyl, 2017).
Third, Moscow is forging alliances with likeminded authoritarian regimes in countries
such as Belarus, Iran, Syria, Venezuela, and, most importantly, China. ‘China and Russia
together,’ writes Krauthammer (2014), ‘represent the core of a new coalition of anti-demo-
cratic autocracies challenging the Western-imposed, post-Cold War status quo.’ Indeed, in
recent years, Russia has substantially deepened its economic, diplomatic, and military
cooperation with China. This has involved the sale of advanced weapons, joint naval
drills, and the conclusion of a massive natural gas deal worth USD 400 billion. In addition,
Russia and China have set up their own institutional structures, such as the BRICS group
and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, at least in part to counter existing
Western-led institutions and organizations (Bolt & Cross, 2018; Cooley, 2013; Kagan,
2008, pp. 53–80; Walker, 2015).
Fourth, and closely related to the previous point, the leadership in Moscow has become
a staunch promotor of conservative values in world politics and openly opposes liberal
ideas ranging from same-sex marriage to free market capitalism (Engström, 2014; Whit-
more, 2013; for background, see Chebankova, 2016). As Matthews (2014), the former
Moscow correspondent of Newsweek, put it,
Like the old Communist International, or Comintern, in its day, Moscow is again building an
international ideological alliance. (…) Putin is pitching for moral leadership of all conservatives
who dislike liberal values. And again, like the Comintern, Putin appears convinced that he is
embarking on a world-historical mission.
From this perspective, Russia seeks nothing less than to undermine the very foundations
of the liberal international order.
The question of course remains: What lies behind Russia’s revisionist ambitions and pol-
icies? Scholars who subscribe to this perspective argue that Russia’s revisionism can be
attributed to three factors. The ﬁrst is a deep-seated sense of being wronged by the
West over the course of recent decades. It is no secret that the leadership in Moscow main-
tains that the West has disregarded Russia’s vital interests after the end of the Cold War
and side-lined it with respect to several important issues – most notably NATO expansion
and the formation of a new security architecture in Europe. Crucially, however, the argu-
ment here is that these injustices are perceived rather than real. As Dibb (2016, p. 8) writes,
‘These are obsessive assertions with little basis in fact and are more a reﬂection of centuries
of Russia’s paranoia about the vulnerability of its borders and its insecurity as a nation
state.’
A second and related argument is that Russia’s political class has an imperial mentality,
especially towards smaller neighbouring countries in central Eurasia. According to Marcel
van Herpen, author of the provocative Putin’s Wars: The Rise of Russia’s New Imperialism,
this mentality has its roots in the early modern period. ‘For the Russian state,’ he writes,
‘colonizing neighbouring territories and subduing neighbouring people has been a
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continuous process. It is, one could almost say, part of Russia’s genetic makeup’ (van
Herpen, 2014, p. 2). This line of thought dovetails with the notion of a Russian Sonderweg
propounded by historians such as Pipes (1974) and Szamuely (1974), who argue that
Russia’s imperialist essence has remained immutable across the centuries, regardless of
the regime in power.
Third, scholars accord signiﬁcant weight to the fact that many members of the Putin
regime have a background in the military and security services and to Russia’s authoritar-
ian form of governance. To quote, once again, van Herpen (2014, p. 56), ‘the new Russian
imperialism is clearly in the interest of Russia’s ruling political and military elite, whose pos-
itions are strengthened and consolidated by a neoimperialist policy.’ A similar point is
made by Kirchick (2017), who asserts that
Russia seeks conﬂict with the West. That is because the Putin regime – nationalist, revisionist,
territorially expansionist – cannot coexist alongside a democratic Europe willing to stand up
for its principles. Moscow sees liberal democracy as a threat and therefore must defeat it.
In essence, the argument is that a conﬂuence of historical, cultural, and domestic political
factors drives Russia’s revisionist attitudes and actions.
How should the West respond? The answer is clear. The United States and its Euro-
pean allies must resist Russian revisionism through a mix of containment and rollback.
This means that they should reinforce diplomatic eﬀorts to isolate Moscow, impose
more severe sanctions, and increase NATO military deployments in Eastern Europe
and the Baltic states (Kroenig, 2015). In addition, the West should provide military
support to post-Soviet states that stand up to Russia, such as Georgia and Ukraine,
and supply them with lethal weapons. Some scholars take this a step further and
suggest that the West should try to create or foment unrest in Russia (Grygiel & Mitchell,
2014). The goal of such a strategy is to weaken Russia from within and, if possible,
replace the current regime in Moscow with a more pro-Western government. As Kirchick
(2017) writes, ‘If a prosperous and democratic Europe is a core national security interest
of the United States, as it has been for the past 80 years, then the Russian regime is one
to be resisted, contained and ultimately dethroned.’ Oﬀense, in this view, is the best
defence.
Russia as a defensive power
If the ﬁrst group of observers sees Russia as inherently bent on overturning the liberal
world order due to internal factors, a second group holds that the underlying drivers of
Moscow’s actions stem from external factors. The argument here is that much of
Russia’s recent conduct is intricately linked to the destabilizing and irresponsible practices
of major Western powers since the end of the Cold War. The West’s reckless behaviour has
thereby forced Russia into a confrontation. Driven not so much by oﬀensive as by defen-
sive aims, Russian leaders are ultimately concerned with upholding a status quo that is
undermined by the transformative agenda and military activities of the United States
and its allies. Russia is thus not a traditional revisionist power seeking to overturn the exist-
ing order but rather a neo-revisionist power that aims to ‘ensure the universal and consist-
ent application of existing norms’ (Sakwa, 2017, p. 131) and that wants to upgrade its own
status in the present order (Romanova, 2018, p. 78).
EUROPEAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY 137
According to this perspective, many of the Soviet and later Russian leaders were
conﬁdent that the overcoming of the Cold War (a joint feat in their eyes) heralded a
new era of cooperation. However, several developments prompted them to give up
their hopes of building a genuine partnership with the West and revert to a more self-
assertive stance. Chief amongst these is the eastward enlargement of NATO, which left
the leadership in Moscow deeply resentful and distrustful of the West. Scholars have
long debated whether a formal promise was made not to expand NATO after the end
of the Cold War (see, e.g. Kramer, 2009; Sarotte, 2010; Shifrinson, 2016). This debate some-
times gets entangled in legalistic quibbles. The fact is that while no oﬃcial document
appears to have been signed, numerous assurances by Western leaders to their Soviet
counterparts were made to the eﬀect that the alliance would – in the words of US Sec-
retary of State James Baker – not move ‘one inch eastward’ (for the quote and background,
see Savranskaya & Blanton, 2017). Failing to disband after its very raison d’être – the Soviet
Union – had disappeared, NATO started instead to expand into former Warsaw Pact
countries and Soviet republics.
From the beginning, NATO enlargement was opposed by policymakers in Moscow, who
interpreted it as a sign of the persistence of Cold War bloc mentality and as a threat to
Russia’s national security. Although President Putin set out to improve relations with
the West and establish a partnership after he came to power, the promise made at the
2008 Bucharest NATO summit of eventual membership for Georgia and Ukraine set the
stage for renewed competition (Charap & Shapiro, 2015; Legvold, 2016). Moscow’s con-
cerns were further exacerbated by the fact that the enlargement of Western Cold War-
era ‘prefabricated institutions’ left it on the outside (Sarotte, 2009), while Russian calls
and proposals for the creation of a new security architecture in Europe were largely
ignored. In the words of Sergei Karaganov, the ‘unﬁnished character of the “Cold War”
in both institutional and intellectual terms’ and the lack of a ‘Europe-wide peace agree-
ment’ (quoted in Sakwa, 2017, p. 143) were the ferment for renewed mistrust and compe-
tition between Russia and the West.
Moreover, while the EU was initially seen in benign terms by Russian policymakers, its
increasing convergence with NATO in ideological, political, and operational terms gave the
impression that ‘EU expansion is a stalking horse for NATO expansion’ (Mearsheimer, 2014,
p. 3). This, goes the argument, is why Russia was so opposed to the association agreement
between the EU and Ukraine. Accordingly, the crisis that broke out in 2014 is best under-
stood as a symptom rather than the cause of East–West tensions (Sakwa, 2015; Trenin,
2014). In a textbook case of a classic security dilemma, NATO enlargement had thus
created the very risk that it was supposed to prevent (Saunders, 2016). For its part, the
EU, as Sakwa (2017, p. 155) so eloquently put it, ‘suﬀered an extraordinary inversion:
instead of overcoming the logic of conﬂict, it became the instrument for its reproduction.’
Issues such as the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in 2002 and the subsequent project
to establish anti-missile bases in Central and Eastern Europe further nourished Russian
insecurities.
The profoundly normative language that accompanied NATO and EU enlargement ren-
dered these processes even more indigestible to Moscow (Diesen, 2015). After 1991, Russia
no longer oﬀered an alternative ideology and did not contest the legitimacy of free elec-
tions and human rights. It did, however, increasingly resent the West’s claim to have the
exclusive right to interpret these concepts (Medvedev, 2008). For example, Putin stressed
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that ‘[democracy] must be a product of internal domestic development in a society’
(quoted in Walsh, 2005). Lamenting Western double standards, Putin also pointed out
that ‘we are constantly being taught about democracy’ but ‘those who teach us do not
want to learn themselves’ (Kremlin, 2007). Thus, as the Russian scholar Lukin (2016,
p. 94) notes, Moscow came to see and reject ‘the bulk of these values as an ideological
smokescreen for the West’s attempt to impose its hegemony.’ In this view, lofty ideals,
operationalized through an agenda of ‘democracy promotion’, mask the West’s geopoliti-
cal interests and ambitions.
Concomitantly, the normative agenda of the West also serves to deny Russia its right-
ful place in the world. Leaders in Moscow have long considered the possession of a
sphere of inﬂuence in the post-Soviet space essential for national security and as a
sign of their country’s great-power status. In insisting on the ‘sovereign choice’ of
smaller states in post-Soviet Eurasia to choose their military alliances, the West thus
undermines Russia’s status and ignores the very real concerns Russia has regarding
the world’s most powerful military alliance creeping up to its border. Indeed, several
scholars have argued that whether intended or not, NATO enlargement and the EU’s
Eastern Partnership have clear geopolitical externalities. Given this, it is not surprising
that Moscow regards them as a threat (see, e.g. Casier, 2016; Charap & Troitskiy, 2013;
Gehring, Urbanski, & Oberthür, 2017; MccGwire, 1998).
The policy prescriptions associated with this perspective emphasize accommodation as
well as the recognition of Russia’s legitimate interests. This means, ﬁrst of all, that any plans
to enlarge NATO must be scrapped and the alliance should limit provocative actions such
as military exercises near Russia’s borders. Such exercises only serve to exacerbate existing
tensions and thus contribute to, rather than reduce, insecurity in Europe. Second, Russia’s
interests in its geographical neighbourhood must be respected. This concerns in the ﬁrst
place Ukraine and the states in the South Caucasus. Short of recognizing a Russian sphere
of inﬂuence there, the United States and its allies should observe non-interference in
countries that Moscow considers essential to its security. Third, the West should drop
the current economic and diplomatic sanctions against Moscow. They only serve to
estrange the Russian public while at the same time deepening and lengthening the
conﬂict. As Tsygankov (2015, p. 299) argues, ‘sanctions and military pressures (…) are
likely to strengthen the potential for anti-Western nationalism inside Russia, thereby
pushing Putin toward more hawkish and provocative actions with regard to Ukraine or
other Eastern European nations.’ The West, in short, must adopt a more accommodating
policy and engage with Moscow.
Russia as an aggressive isolationist
A third group of scholars argues that Russia has neither the will nor the capacity to reshape
the existing international order. Russia, after all, is a declining power weakened by econ-
omic problems, widespread corruption, and a severe demographic crisis. This places
restraints on Russia’s ability to overturn global governance arrangements and institutions.
Nor does the Putin government have a particular ideology that it wants to promote inter-
nationally. This does not mean, however, that Russia is going to integrate itself smoothly
into the existing global order. On the contrary, Russia has come to play a spoiler role in
international aﬀairs. The ultimate aim of the Kremlin is to inoculate Russia from Western
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inﬂuences. Accordingly, Moscow’s international behaviour can be described as a form of
‘aggressive isolationism’ – a notion coined by Krastev and Holmes (2015). ‘Russia’s geopo-
litical adventures,’ they write, ‘are driven largely by its leadership’s deep anxiety about the
country’s domestic weaknesses’ (Krastev & Holmes, 2015).
Russia’s ‘aggressive isolationism’ has manifested itself in three major ways. First, the
Kremlin is deeply fearful of the spread of democratic norms and values in the post-
Soviet space, as they could spill over into Russia and thus undermine the Putin govern-
ment’s hold on power. Such fears have been stoked by the colour revolutions in the
mid-2000s, the Arab spring in 2010–2011, and especially by the Euromaidan protests in
Kiev in 2014. As Krastev and Holmes (2015) argue,
The surprising and disconcerting developments inside Ukraine, which led to a problematic
Russian client being chased from oﬃce only to be replaced by an unabashedly anti-Russian
successor, suggested that Western ways of thinking, not NATO tanks, were the most threaten-
ing forces advancing on Moscow.
Likewise, Orttung and Walker (2015, February 13) assert, ‘Above all else, the Kremlin fears
the rise of democratic governments on its border that could serve as an alternative model
to Putin’s “vertical of power.”’ Hence, the Putin government has worked hard to bolster
authoritarian regimes in the post-Soviet space, such as the Lukashenka government in
Belarus, and seeks to destabilize democratizing states like Georgia and Ukraine – if
need be by military means. In this view, regime security considerations are the main
driver of Russia’s ‘near abroad’ assertion (Ambrosio, 2009; Lewis, 2016; Vanderhill, 2013,
pp. 41–96; Wilson, 2014).
Second, the Kremlin deliberately creates external crises to stir up nationalist sentiments.
The reason is simple. During much of the 2000s, the Putin government’s legitimacy was
based on economic growth. In other words, there was a social contract between large sec-
tions of the population and the government. The leadership in Moscow provided for the
economic wellbeing of ordinary Russians in exchange for their political compliance. This
social contract was eﬀectively broken in the late 2000s when Russia’s economy stagnated,
largely due to the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis and the slump in oil and natural gas prices. Real
wages decreased, the standard of living declined, and unemployment soared. As a
result, the popularity of the Putin regime took a hit. Moreover, after fraud-tainted Duma
elections in December 2011 and before Putin’s return to the presidency in May 2012,
large-scale popular protests against the regime took place in Moscow and other major
Russian cities. In response to these developments, the Kremlin took measures to curtail
the activities of NGOs operating inside the country. In addition, Moscow adopted a
more nationalistic and aggressive foreign policy, primary examples being Russia’s takeover
of Crimea and its military intervention in Syria. The ultimate goal of these operations has
been to distract public attention from political and economic problems at home. As Shevt-
sova (2015) writes, ‘for the Kremlin, the turn to expansionism is (…) a pressure release
valve and a way to compensate for its weaknesses in other areas (including the
economy).’ In a similar vein, Aron (2015) concludes that ‘Vladimir Putin’s foreign policy
can only be understood in the context of the regime’s evolving domestic weakness.’
Third, and closely related to the previous points, the leadership in Moscow has pro-
moted an anti-Western narrative and seeks to portray itself as a bastion of conservative
values – not necessarily because Putin and his inner circle believe in those values, but
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because it serves the narrower interests of the regime. The purpose is to mobilize conser-
vative groups in Russia and create conﬂicts with the United States and other Western
countries. It is against this background that Moscow’s meddling in the US elections and
its support for populist parties in Europe are best understood. As McFaul (2014) puts it,
‘In addition to more autocracy, Mr. Putin needed an enemy – the United States – to
strengthen his legitimacy.’ In a similar vein, Snetkov (2015, p. 5) asserts, ‘it [the Putin gov-
ernment] has adopted an aggressive and confrontational conservative-nationalist and
anti-Western discourse as a way of solidifying an increasingly disgruntled and shaky dom-
estic order.’ In other words, President Putin and his associates deliberately fuel a ‘besieged
fortress’myth that pits Russia against the West to maintain popular support for the regime.
In essence, a number of scholars attribute Russia’s assertive international behaviour to
domestic causes. In that sense, there is some overlap with the ﬁrst perspective, which
holds that Russia’s authoritarian form of governance is a root cause of its revisionist
agenda. Indeed, some observers and commentators straddle the line between these
two analytical positions (e.g. Lewis, 2016; Shevtsova, 2014). Yet there is an important diﬀer-
ence. According to the ﬁrst perspective, Russia’s autocratic ideology pushes Moscow
towards an aggressive foreign policy, the aim of which is to overturn the foundations of
the liberal post-Cold War order. In contrast, the argument here is that the Putin govern-
ment uses foreign policy in an instrumental and calculated fashion to shore up its legiti-
macy at home.
How, then, should the West deal with Russia and its self-isolationist regime? The answer
to this question is less clear than it is from the previous two perspectives. If the United
States and its European allies decide to pursue an engagement policy vis-à-vis Russia,
this will only result in more trouble. After all, by the logic of the argument presented
here, the Putin government seeks to manufacture external conﬂicts for domestic political
purposes. Thus, accommodative policies towards Russia will lead nowhere. If anything,
they will incite the Kremlin to create foreign policy crises elsewhere. If, on the other
hand, the United States and its European allies decide to adopt a military containment
posture vis-à-vis Russia, this will play into the Kremlin’s hands by lending credence to
its ‘besieged fortress’ narrative. Likewise, the imposition of economic sanctions on
Russia will backﬁre, as it provides the Putin government with the opportunity to isolate
the country further from the West. Krastev and Leonard (2014, p. 5) have put the point
well: ‘The economic costs of sanctions,’ they write,
will allow Putin to hide the failures of the Kremlin’s economic policies. Sanctions also provide
Putin cover to push for managed isolation from globalization through policies designed to
nationalize the internet, prohibit foreign ownership of the media, and limit travel.
Hence, the best option for the West might be a so-called constrainment policy. This implies
that the West should engage economically with Russia, but at the same time strengthen
NATO to contain Moscow’s troublemaking activities on the international stage (Götz, 2016,
p. 256). In addition, there is a debate among analysts as to whether the West should
impose further sanctions on President Putin’s closest friends and cronies. On the one
hand, this might increase the pressure on the Kremlin from the inside. On the other
hand, the Kremlin might capitalize on targeted sanctions to unite Russia’s elites, who
have nowhere else to turn, behind the regime (for contrasting views, see Ashford, 2016;
Dobrokhotov, 2017; MacFarquhar, 2018; Rutland, 2014).
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Be that as it may, scholars who suggest that domestic political considerations are the
chief motivating force behind Russia’s confrontation with the West often take a more
relaxed stance than those who subscribe to the two abovementioned perspectives.
While Moscow can certainly cause trouble on the global stage in the short term, it does
not have the material wherewithal or political will to undermine the existing international
order. On the contrary, Russia’s economic modernization depends on integration with the
global economy and access to Western markets. In the medium to long term, therefore,
Russia has strong incentives to establish good relations with advanced industrial states.
In this view, the Putin regime is an anachronistic autocracy that ﬁnds itself on the
wrong side of history, to borrow Barack Obama’s pithy phrase. This means that if
another, more democratic regime comes to power, there are good chances that Russia
will fully integrate into the existing liberal international order.
The three perspectives revisited: limitations and shortcomings
As shown in the previous section, one can distinguish between three major positions in
the ongoing debate about Moscow’s role in the present world order. Table 1 summarizes
the main arguments of each perspective.
All three positions are supported by anecdotal evidence and, at ﬁrst glance, they appear
to shed substantial light on Russia’s international behaviour. On closer inspection,
however, it becomes clear that each perspective is hampered by limitations and
shortcomings.
To begin with, there are a number of reasons to be sceptical about the ‘revanchist
Russia’ perspective. First, it adopts an overly deterministic position, which negates the
open-ended character of history by underlining its predetermined course through
certain ‘iron laws’ and the supposedly unchanging ‘essence’ of Russia. In so doing, this
Table 1. Three perspectives on Russia’s world order policy
Perspective Revanchist Russia Defensive Russia Isolationist Russia
What are Russia’s
main objectives?
– to overturn the Western-
led liberal international
order
– to create a Tsarist-style
empire on the territory
of the former USSR
– to promote conservative
values in world politics
– to be treated as an equal by
Western powers
– to halt the eastward expansion
of NATO and the EU
– to defend ‘state sovereignty’ as
a fundamental principle of
international law
– to stoke nationalism by
creating crises with the
West
– to prevent the spread of
democratic norms into
the post-Soviet space






– imagined victimhood at the
hands of the West
– a deeply rooted imperial




– Western encroachment (both
geopolitical and
normative)
– a hunt for great-power status
and prestige
– national security concerns
– regime insecurity
– parochial interests of




– pursue a containment
policy
– roll back Russia’s
geopolitical advances
– pursue an engagement policy
– stop NATO and EU expansion
– pursue a constrainment
policy
– impose targeted sanctions on
President Putin’s inner
circle
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perspective eﬀectively denies the role of individual agency: Whoever the leader is, or
whatever the regime may be, Russians are subordinate to the quest for imperial greatness.
This is a view that incidentally dovetails with that of extreme Russian nationalists, who see
Russian history in similar holistic terms of a ‘single stream’ that connects Ivan IV, Peter the
Great, Stalin, and Putin. However, Russia has experienced tremendous upheavals through-
out history that dramatically changed its society and its relations with the outside world.
This happened often at the instigation of one or a few individuals. Both the beginning and
the end of the Soviet Union, for example, serve as powerful reminders of the role agency
plays in aﬀecting Moscow’s internal and external aﬀairs. Furthermore, essentialist claims
about Russian identity do not oﬀer much insight into the dynamics of Moscow’s approach
to the liberal international order, which has signiﬁcantly ﬂuctuated over time (Tsygankov,
2016).
Second, Russia’s revisionist behaviour should not be exaggerated. Its intervention in
Ukraine has remained relatively limited, as has its military activity in other post-Soviet
states (Götz, 2016, p. 9). In fact, the scope of Russia’s revanchist aims is a matter of
debate. It is doubtful whether Moscow has a blueprint for an alternative international
order with diﬀerent norms and principles than the current one. Nor does its promotion
of conservative authoritarianism seem to constitute a genuine agenda. As Lewis (2016)
writes, ‘the export of conservative social and political values (…) has so far not developed
into a coherent campaign, but remains a rather ad hoc and inchoate critique by Russian
politicians of “multiculturalism”, LGBT rights and “political correctness” in Europe.’ Further-
more, the ‘revanchist Russia’ perspective is unable to account for the numerous instances
in which Moscow has adhered to the norms, rules, and institutions that are associated with
the existing liberal order. While it might be a stretch to describe Moscow as a consistent
defender of multilateralism (Lo, 2015), it has supported frameworks such as the 2015 Iran
nuclear deal. It also acceded to the World Trade Organization in 2012 – after 19 years of
talks – and continues to be a member of the European Court of Human Rights. The
liberal goals and supranational methods of these institutions hardly ﬁt with a revisionist
imperial agenda.
Third, Moscow’s behaviour is much more in line with that of an ordinary great power
than the ‘revanchist Russia’ perspective makes it out to be. For one thing, Russia is by
no means unique in its quest to establish a zone of inﬂuence in its near neighbourhood.
As Carpenter (2017, January 19) points out,
Russia is hardly the only country to regard the [sphere of inﬂuence] concept as important for
its security. Or do U.S. oﬃcials believe that Chinese actions in the South China Sea, Turkey’s
policies towards Iraq and Syria, and Saudi Arabia’s actions in Bahrain and Yemen do not
involve such a consideration?
For another, interference in the domestic affairs of other states is something of a habit for
great powers. Whether they are democratic or authoritarian does not seem to make a
difference in this regard. The United States, for example, has a long track record of med-
dling in the internal affairs and electoral processes of other countries (Levin, 2016). It is
therefore unlikely that a more democratic Russia will substantially change its key
foreign policy objectives and activities. Furthermore, the discrediting of Russian concerns
over NATO enlargement as an ‘imagined’ threat, rather than a ‘real’ one, misses the mark.
Any international relations scholar worth their salt knows that uncertainty about others’
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intentions is central to security dilemma dynamics. Thus, Moscow’s fears should not be
brushed aside as idiosyncratic Russian paranoia. In conclusion, it seems fair to say that
the ‘revanchist Russia’ perspective faces an array of explanatory challenges and
shortcomings.
The ‘defensive Russia’ perspective is not entirely convincing either, for at least three
reasons. First, the claim that Russia is a staunch defender of principles like state sover-
eignty and non-interference in internal aﬀairs is problematic. Granted, Moscow consist-
ently emphasizes these norms in oﬃcial policy documents and promotes them in
diplomatic forums. In practice, however, Russia has violated such principles repeatedly
within the post-Soviet space. Examples are Russia’s takeover of Crimea, its meddling in
south-eastern Ukraine, and its longstanding support for separatist regions in Georgia
(Abkhazia and South Ossetia) and Moldova (Transnistria). As Lo (2015, pp. 71–72) rightly
remarks, ‘there is a stark disconnect between its [Russia’s] formal allegiance to the
“primacy of international law” and the territorial integrity of nation-states, and a highly
selective approach toward implementing such principles.’ Likewise, Bolt and Cross
(2018, p. 30) note that, ‘while Russia professes to champion sovereignty and non-interven-
tion as standards for the world order, these guidelines somehow do not apply to Moscow’s
own behaviour in its immediate neighbourhood.’ In other words, there is a gap between
Moscow’s rhetoric and actions, which does not square with the ‘defensive Russia’
perspective.
Second, it appears questionable whether Russia’s assertive foreign policy is a natural
and almost automatic response to aggressive encroachments, both normative and geopo-
litical, from Western powers. For example, it is highly debatable whether Russia’s takeover
of Crimea was a pre-emptive move, as some claim, to block NATO from establishing a
naval base there (for contrasting views, see Milne, 2014, March 5; Motyl, 2015). Likewise,
there was little risk that NATO would oﬀer post-Yanukovych Ukraine a Membership
Action Plan. According to then-Russian President Medvedev’s own account, the alliance
seemed to have understood the dangers of eastward enlargement and given up on it
after the 2008 war in Georgia (Reuters, 2011). The ﬁnancial crisis of that same year and
the ensuing Greek debt crisis further contributed to enlargement fatigue among many
EU member states. Consequently, there was little prospect for Ukraine (or any other
post-Soviet state, for that matter) to join either of these two organizations in the short
to medium term. Moreover, European militaries had downsized since the end of the
Cold War, while the US was engaged in its so-called pivot to Asia. If anything, the direct
threat posed by NATO to Russia was therefore dwindling. Against this background, it is
diﬃcult to interpret Moscow’s takeover of Crimea and activities in eastern Ukraine as a
purely defensive response to external pressures.
Thirdly, it is unclear why the West – and not Russia – should adjust its status ambitions
and policies. As Freire (2011) demonstrates, Russia is a status overachiever relative to the
power resources (economic, demographic, and military) that it controls. This means that
Russia punches above its weight and occupies an extremely prominent position in
world politics – at least in comparison to other countries with a roughly equal amount
of material capabilities such as Japan, Brazil, or India. None of these countries is a perma-
nent member of the UN Security Council, for example. This raises the question of how
many great-power privileges must Russia be granted before its outsized status ambitions
are satisﬁed. More generally, it is questionable whether the creation of a modern-day
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concert of great powers, similar to the Concert of Europe in the second half of the nine-
teenth century, is possible or even desirable. As Rynning (2015, p. 552) observes,
not only is concerted power in Europe unlikely, but its pursuit could be dangerous in so far as it
could herald the type of unrestrained or ﬂexible balance of power politics that presaged the
great wars of the twentieth century.
Kagan (2017) likewise asserts that,
a return to spheres of inﬂuence would not calm international waters. It would merely return
the world to the condition it was in at the end of the nineteenth century, with competing great
powers clashing over inevitably intersecting and overlapping spheres.
In essence, both the policy prescriptions derived from the ‘defensive Russia’ perspective
and its explanations of Moscow’s international conduct require some elaboration.
The ‘isolationist Russia’ perspective, for its part, also encounters a number of chal-
lenges. To start with, there are good reasons to doubt that the main objective of
Russia’s ‘near abroad’ assertion is to prevent the spread of democracy in its neighbour-
hood. After all, Russia has used economic sanctions and other forms of coercive diplo-
macy in the post-Soviet space not only vis-à-vis democratic or democratizing states like
the Baltic republics, Georgia, and Ukraine, but also towards authoritarian countries such
as Belarus and Turkmenistan. In fact, in 2009 the Russian leadership aided and abetted
the overthrow of a fellow authoritarian regime in Kyrgyzstan (Blank, 2010, April 14).
Russia also played a key role in the democratic revolution in Georgia in 2003, when it
helped broker a peaceful transition of power from Shevardnadze to Saakashvili. What
is more, Moscow’s relations with Georgia markedly improved after Saakashvili left
oﬃce in 2013. By all accounts, Georgia has become more – not less – democratic
since then (Way, 2015, p. 701). This suggests that regime type considerations have
little eﬀect on Moscow’s neighbourhood policy. It is also worth noting that Moscow’s
ambitions to attain regional primacy go back to the early 1990s. At that time, a
broad-based consensus emerged in Russia’s foreign policy establishment to create a
sphere of inﬂuence in the post-Soviet space. By late 1993, even President Boris Yeltsin
and his liberal-minded Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev embraced this position (see,
e.g. Hill & Jewett, 1994; Porter & Saivetz, 1994). All this casts doubt on the thesis that
countering democracy is the fundamental motivation behind Russia’s assertiveness in
the post-Soviet region.
Furthermore, the argument that regime security is the main motive for Moscow’s
increasingly confrontational policy vis-à-vis the West is speculative. So far, the existing
scholarship has not been able to present any clear-cut evidence in the form of policy docu-
ments, transcripts of high-level meetings, or statements by Kremlin oﬃcials. Of course, it is
extremely diﬃcult to gain access to internal government documents or records of the
private deliberations of President Putin and his associates. Yet even the circumstantial evi-
dence for this argument remains ambivalent. Consider the timing of Russia’s turn towards
a more assertive approach. Although it is diﬃcult to pinpoint an exact start date, most
scholars agree that the Putin government began pursuing a more muscular policy
towards the West sometime in the mid-2000s (see, e.g. Lucas, 2008; Stent, 2014,
pp. 135–176; Trenin, 2007). At that time, the popularity of the Russian President was
increasing on the back of a booming economy. Thus, from a domestic political perspective,
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there was little reason for Putin to lash out at the West and create a conﬂict, which, in turn,
would boost his popular legitimacy. His approval ratings were already sky-high. There is, in
short, a timing problem for the ‘isolationist Russia’ perspective.
In addition, and related to the previous point, Moscow’s opposition to NATO enlarge-
ment preceded the Putin government. In fact, it can be traced back to the early to mid-
1990s. After a brief ‘honeymoon’ period immediately after the Soviet Union’s dissolution,
Russian politicians of all stripes became increasingly opposed to NATO expansion and
expressed this openly (Black, 2000; Dannreuther, 1999). At a high-level summit in Budapest
in December 1994 for instance, President Yeltsin warned of a ‘cold peace’ if the alliance
decided to move eastwards (quoted in Williams, 1994). This suggests that there is some-
thing more to Russia’s anxiety about NATO expansion than parochial interests of President
Putin and his entourage.
Finally, andmore generally, it is easy to vilify Russia for being on thewrong side of history.
Yet, this argument rests on an implicit liberal teleology of historical development, which
foresees the spread of democracy and free market capitalism across the globe. Perhaps
the strongest and most powerful expression of this perspective is Fukuyama’s (1989)
‘end of history’ thesis – a thesis that has been criticized by an array of scholars on both nor-
mative and empirical grounds (see, e.g. Kagan, 2008; Mansﬁeld et al., 1999; Stanley & Lee,
2014). Indeed,many of the so-called emerging powers in today’s world are not transitioning
towards liberal democracy. Nor have they fully embraced free market rules. Instead, they
follow their own path of socio-economic development and pursue diﬀerent forms of
state capitalism (Bremmer, 2009; Kurlantzick, 2016). When seen against this background,
it beggars belief to suppose that non-Western powers – such as Russia and China, but
also India and Brazil – will fully embrace the existing US-led liberal international order. It
seems more likely that rising powers will want to shape the global order in accordance
with their own particular values and political agendas. As Kupchan (2012, p. 4) puts it,
rising powers will as a matter of course seek to adjust the prevailing order in ways that advan-
tage their own values and interests. They have been doing so since the beginning of time, and
the coming era will be no diﬀerent (also see Stuenkel, 2016).
In that sense, Moscow’s global-order goals and its international conduct appear more like
‘normal’ great-power behaviour than aberrations to be explained by the nature of Russia’s
political system.
In sum, all three perspectives are vulnerable to a range of criticisms. This does not mean
that the existing accounts should be discarded, however. Rather, our point is that while the
existing accounts face explanatory challenges, they provide for a structured way of think-
ing about Russia’s international behaviour and its underlying drivers. Thus, we suggest that
scholars need to adjust, modify, and expand the existing perspectives, or integrate
diﬀerent aspects of them, in order to address the identiﬁed challenges. In so doing, scho-
lars will be able to gain new insights and develop a deeper understanding of Moscow’s
world order policy. That is the purpose of this special issue.
Road map of the special issue
The ﬁrst article, by Tuomas Forsberg, adopts a long durée perspective and examines Russia’s
role in shaping the European order atmajor postwar junctures. Forsberg looks at the Vienna
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settlement of 1815, the Treaty of Paris of 1856 that ended the CrimeanWar, the 1919 peace
conference in Versailles, the establishment of the post-World War II order in the 1940s, and
the creation of Europe’s security architecture after the Cold War. Forsberg not only reviews
Russia’s role in these order building moments, he also describes what lessons the political
elite in today’s Russia has drawn from them. His analysis demonstrates that Russia’s role in
shaping the European order at postwar moments has varied signiﬁcantly over time and
cannot be simply read oﬀ from the balance of power. This indicates, so Forsberg, that
Russia’s leadership has substantial agency in shaping its approach towards the European
order. Moreover, he argues that the European security architecture after the end of the
Cold War was not imposed on Russia, as the Putin government contends, but was
created through a series of consensual agreements and treaties between the Soviet
Union/Russia, the United States, and major European powers. Accordingly, it is misleading
to suggest that the origins of the present crisis between Russia and theWest can be ascribed
to the formation of Europe’s post-Cold War security order in the early 1990s. The article’s
bottom line is that scholars should not engage in historical essentialism. Instead, they
should focus on recent events and developments to explain the current crisis in East–
West relations.
The second article, by Kevork Oskanian, examines the same issue, albeit from a
diﬀerent angle. Oskanian applies insights from the classical realist perspective to shed
light on the downturn in relations between Russia and the West. More speciﬁcally, he
draws on E.H. Carr’s famous book The Twenty Years’ Crisis and oﬀers a withering critique
of Western policies towards Russia. Oskanian argues that the West has been committed
to expand the liberal order eastward after the Soviet Union’s dissolution in 1991. This has
included the enlargement of institutional arrangements such as NATO and the European
Union, the promotion of democratic governance structures, and the spread of free
market capitalism. Although the West has couched the expansion of the liberal order
in universalist terms, Oskanian holds that these initiatives were not geopolitically
neutral. Quite the opposite, they have contributed to perpetuate US predominance
and created structures that beneﬁt the West’s security and economic interests at the
expense of Russia’s power and status. In military, economic, and normative terms,
Russia has been eﬀectively side-lined in the present order. This, so Oskanian, is the
root cause of the current crisis. He concludes that a pan-European security system can
only be constructed when the United States and its allies give up the presumption
that the expansion of Western-led institutions, democracy, and free trade is a positive-
sum game for all involved, but recognize that some states – Russia, in this case – will
lose out and therefore have strong incentives to push back.
The third article, by Roger Kanet, complements the previous two pieces by providing an
overview of Russia’s relations with the West from the honeymoon period of the early 1990s
to the present crisis. His main argument is that the downward spiral in East–West relations
is driven by two interactive dynamics. First, there is the eastward expansion of Euro-Atlan-
tic institutions, most importantly NATO and the EU, which undermines Russia’s strategic
interest to be the dominant power in the former Soviet space. The second development
relates to Russia’s strategic culture, which has become more assertive over the course of
the last two decades. This can be partly explained by the increased level of external
pressure from NATO and EU expansion, but also and above all by domestic developments
in Russia. The Putin government’s turn towards authoritarianism and its obsession with
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regime security has resulted in a strategic culture that is characterized by a mix of paranoia
and willingness to use force. Taken together, the expansion of Euro-Atlantic institutions
and the evolution of Russian strategic culture can explain Moscow’s increasingly antagon-
istic attitude towards the West. Kanet’s article concludes by brieﬂy describing the likely
eﬀects of the Trump presidency for US-Russia relations and the liberal international
order more generally.
The fourth article is by Marcin Kaczmarski. He focuses on Russian-Chinese relations and
explores to what extent the world order visions and policies of the two countries overlap.
Drawing on primary sources, Kaczmarski shows that there is substantial overlap between
Russia and China regarding their publicly stated world order visions. Both resist Western
interventionism, stress the importance of the UN Security Council, warn of the dangers
of transnational threats, embrace traditional conceptions of state sovereignty, and empha-
size the need to create new institutional arrangements at global and regional levels.
Beyond the realm of rhetoric, however, there are growing rifts in the world order policies
of the two countries. China is becoming an increasingly signiﬁcant contributor to global
governance. This includes UN peacekeeping operations, the ﬁght against climate
change, the provision of development aid, and the promotion of an open economic
order. Beijing is generally interested in a stable and predictable international system.
This is the prerequisite, after all, for its continued economic rise and domestic develop-
ment. Russia, on the other hand, shies away from assuming global responsibilities.
Moscow shows little willingness to accept international commitments and contribute to
global public goods. Instead, it has emerged as a spoiler that thrives on uncertainty and
insecurity in international aﬀairs. Thus, despite much fretting by some Western observers
about the formation of a Russo-Chinese axis in international aﬀairs, such an axis is unlikely
to come to fruition. According to Kaczmarski, the diﬀerent world order policies of Russia
and China will constrain partnership between them.
The ﬁnal article, by Zachary Paikin, Kaneshko Sangar, and Camille-Renaud Merlen,
builds on Kaczmarski’s and seeks to understand the sources and prospects of the norma-
tive convergence between China and Russia. Using insights from Adam Watson’s pendu-
lum model, the article examines Russia’s post-2014 Eurasian predicament. The authors
argue that Russia’s exclusion from the Euro-Atlanticist order after the end of the Cold
War can be seen as an example of a (too) rapid rightward pendulum swing, that is,
towards a more centralized international society. The emerging Sino-Eurasian order has
not featured such a swing on normative issues and has consequently come to be seen
in Moscow as a better ﬁt for Russia. This means that the current China–Russia partnership
rests on Moscow’s disillusionment with the West and a normative convergence with
Beijing on certain key issues, along with a sprawling set of international and regional insti-
tutions. Yet the developing partnership between Moscow and Beijing carries its own risks,
chief among them – at least for Russia – that of becoming a junior partner to China. The
authors thus conclude that the future of this partnership is anything but certain, with inse-
curities on Moscow’s side potentially inhibiting the prospects of closer Russian-Chinese
cooperation.
Note
1. This overview and the following discussion build upon Götz (2016).
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